tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post3198174689997404406..comments2023-11-05T04:16:44.937-05:00Comments on Advanced Football Analytics (formerly Advanced NFL Stats): Risk-Seeking Behavior?Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger48125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-5551310904056858972012-11-05T16:13:06.852-05:002012-11-05T16:13:06.852-05:00A couple of possible examples of risk-taking that ...A couple of possible examples of risk-taking that I have wondered about: intentional fouls in basketball that send an opponent to the free-throw line, and running a kickoff out of the end zone when protecting a lead late in a football game (or attempting a punt return vs. fair catch in similar circumstances). Also NHL shoot-outs where a coach saves his best shoot-out player as the third shooter.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-39679670895848654252012-11-01T11:16:04.636-04:002012-11-01T11:16:04.636-04:00On my original comment about 0.03% of mutual funds...On my original comment about 0.03% of mutual funds beating the S&P 500, it was measured over a 10 year period. So, if you invested $100 dollars in the S&P 500 and $100 dollars in every mutual fund in 1993, only 0.03% of the mutual fund investments will be worth more than the $100 invested in the S&P 500.<br /><br />Over the course of a quarter there will be tens of thousands of funds that beat the S&P. If we believe that returns are normally distributed (they aren't, but they are close enough for this example), then half of all funds will be the S&P 500. Less will beat it for four consecutive quarters, but there will sill be thousands. After 10 years, there will still be a couple that have beaten the S&P 500, but the vast majority (99.97% according to this study)will fall short of the index. Was this more clear?Trenthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10175563555409386703noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-79984148201483051632012-10-31T23:45:41.291-04:002012-10-31T23:45:41.291-04:00@ probable picks
YES, however while I agree that ...@ probable picks<br /><br />YES, however while I agree that the game works much in the way you describe, I disagree that the coach dies at the end of the game. It drives me crazy when a middle of the road offense pulls out all the stops in a "unwinnable game" i.e. down 18 points w/ 6 minutes left and Tony Romo under center. <br /><br />A geometric series thought process could argue that the focus of the game should be on running successful plays, building a positive history, and protecting your playbooks from video. Instead, the risk adverse coach only sees the impending loss and compounds the loss withe the psychological noise of throwing 5 interceptions...or 3. <br /><br />Also, I have wired money to Louisiana, because a friend was holding the 9 of spades while the flop and turn showed10, J,Q,K. All in, with a marker he lost to a guy holding the Ace. His wife was not happy, and after the 4 hour drive home I'm sure he wished I'd sent enough for her to take a plane, lol. tmknoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-90430599456015267932012-10-31T23:22:02.777-04:002012-10-31T23:22:02.777-04:00@ Allen
I skipped ahead so sorry if this was answ...@ Allen<br /><br />I skipped ahead so sorry if this was answered already. The risk/reward study numbers for the lottery come from numerous psychology and economics experiments and studies. Not sure which he used. <br /><br />As was mentioned, risking $5 for a 1% chance at walking away with $100 seems counter intuitive, except when you think about how much value $100 has to you versus the value you place on $5 and the thrill of a risk. <br /><br />The risk of putting yourself out there to secure a win doesn't correlate because the loss is worth the same amount as the win (except in the post season) and as we have all seen, they way football is played in the final 2 minutes of a close game is far different then the average. <br /><br />When it comes to risk, I thinknof Tony Romo. (Whom I affectionately refer to as The NFL's Premier Quarterback). tmknoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-85230883434146548122012-10-31T18:56:55.249-04:002012-10-31T18:56:55.249-04:00It seems like the draft could be an example of con...It seems like the draft could be an example of consistent risk-seeking behavior. Every year there are high draft picks and millions of dollars spent on combine warriors without the body of on-the-field work that would justify the expense.Eric Moorehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01496717842529415018noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-66973671287444027612012-10-31T13:25:33.922-04:002012-10-31T13:25:33.922-04:00correction: What's interesting is the handful ...correction: What's interesting is the handful of guys scoring very well in both +EPA / +WPA and limited yards allowed per coverage snap. <br /><br />Message board spam over.Jared Doomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445479616742729527noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-76129290718653201512012-10-31T13:24:58.811-04:002012-10-31T13:24:58.811-04:00i am by no means an expert in probabilities, i jus...i am by no means an expert in probabilities, i just wanted to say that people reading this page is extremly educated, i am really impressed with the comments, you people surely know your thing.i read you to see if something sticks with me.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06998993491371828744noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-79034903697951880002012-10-31T13:24:09.159-04:002012-10-31T13:24:09.159-04:00Expanding on the topic you're already aware of...Expanding on the topic you're already aware of, some anecdotal evidence (I'm guessing I'll be able to find non-anecdotal when I have some time) - in 2009, of starting CBs, (then) Miami's Vontae Davis allowed a league-high 2.4 yards per snap in coverage (893 in total), BUT ranked 3rd in +WPA. <br /><br />So, he was a playmaker alright, just at the expense of being the worse cover corner in the league. What's interesting is the handful of guys scoring very well.<br /><br />It may interest you that DeAngelo Hall shows similar tendencies (great playmaker, horrible at covering people).Jared Doomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445479616742729527noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-2309516968235336312012-10-31T13:23:57.653-04:002012-10-31T13:23:57.653-04:00i am by no means an expert in probabilities, i jus...i am by no means an expert in probabilities, i just wanted to say that people reading this page is extremly educated, i am really impressed with the comments, you people surely know your thing.i read you to see if something sticks with me.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06998993491371828744noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-25756550963078570622012-10-31T13:09:37.887-04:002012-10-31T13:09:37.887-04:00Going back to your original "measuring defens...Going back to your original "measuring defensive playmakers" post, I see you've already noted my concerns with +EPA/+WPA.<br /><br />Ignore related statement in previous post, I suppose.Jared Doomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445479616742729527noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-88821788153833667802012-10-31T13:00:19.618-04:002012-10-31T13:00:19.618-04:00I think specific individual players will often exh...I think specific individual players will often exhibit risk seeking behavior - consistently over their careers.<br /><br />Specifically on defense more aggressive/risk-seekers get more statistical glory - for example a cornerback that keeps the QB from throwing his direction receives no credit for +EPA, interceptions, tackles, passes broken up, etc. See Nnamdi Asomugha. Nnamdi has had the highest ratio of (snaps in pass coverage) / (balls thrown at), by an impressive margin, for the 2011, 2010, 2009, and 2008 seasons.<br /><br />- Defensive backs tending to try to jump a route & intercept may be risk-seeking, or a DE going for the strip+sack rather than only the strip. Guys going for the big hit instead of avoiding a missed tackle.<br /><br />This is one possible problem I've thought of with your measuring individual defensive player performance by "+EPA" only. If a defensive player is a risk seeker then their EPA / play distribution would be a lot wider than a "risk-neutral" player, so if you're only showing the positive plays, they'll tend to be more positive, but it may be hiding that the negative plays are much more negative.<br /><br /><br />- Brett Favre - I would not be surprised if his ratio of throw-aways to interceptions is < 1.0. If you remember he would also often do ridiculous little shovel-pass things in very tight windows, or make extremely risky throws while being pulled down by a defender.<br /><br />- Fast/Quick RBs: Chris Johnson, Jamaal Charles, Barry Sanders, etc. I know Barry was known for the amount of negative yardage runs he would rack up, and I've seen both CJ0.7K and JChars cut runs back all the way across the field (occasionally with success). Having said that I do remember you having an article noting the lack of variation b/w running back YPC distribution, but my instincts say, of backs with 4.0+ YPC, these guys are up there in % of runs losing yardage.<br /><br />- Fast WRs / return guys running backwards, cutting all the way back across the field, and/or exhibiting poor ball security - Deion (ran palming the ball), Randy Moss, DeSean Jackson. Seems like a lot of the "divas" are risk seeking players. Moss would occasionally throw unecessary laterals when getting tackled, and perhaps caught some balls with one had where he could have used 2.<br /><br />- Troy Polamalua (sp?) - On several occasions he has jumped over the line of scrimmage and latched onto the QB just as the ball is being snapped. Given I've never seen him screw that up, maybe it's not risk-seeking. But he doesn't seem to stand out in a particular game as an amazing guy every play. It seems like his value is concentrated on a few incredible (often high-risk) plays.<br /><br /><br /><br />Jared Doomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17445479616742729527noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-63827651219776098292012-10-31T11:24:58.859-04:002012-10-31T11:24:58.859-04:00I don't understand what is meant by "risk...I don't understand what is meant by "risk aversion" here. If we are talking about the context of a football game, strictly speaking, there should be no notion of risk aversion or risk seeking - for every decision, there is one that maximizes the probability of winning. The other decisions are suboptimal. Of course, determining which decision is best is not always easy (and may involve some subjective assessments).<br /><br />This is unlike finance where the units are money and you can tradeoff expected money for downside risk. Football is zero sum.<br /><br />So when we say "risk aversion" in the context of the decisions of coaches, what exactly is meant? Are we talking about their incentives and job security, as well as how they will be judged?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-28321126847846698402012-10-31T06:22:12.499-04:002012-10-31T06:22:12.499-04:00In curling, the skip with the hammer will often ch...In curling, the skip with the hammer will often choose to score 0 points rather than 1 point, depending on the situation, because it makes it far more likely that s/he will score multiple points (and far less likely that the opponent will score multiple points) in the following end.Ropkehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02887164455530725214noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-56349979565729202162012-10-31T01:46:36.959-04:002012-10-31T01:46:36.959-04:00It’s unfortunate that I’m only getting to comment ...It’s unfortunate that I’m only getting to comment on this now, because what I’m about to share with you will (hopefully) change your thinking about risk adversity. A year ago, Ole Peters pointed out a fundamental flaw in economics regarding the risk and reward trade-off. <br /><br />Paper here: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1011.4404v2.pdf<br /><br />Good summary here: http://rick.bookstaber.com/2011/10/crack-in-foundation-error-that-has.html<br /><br />I highly recommend reading the paper, but I will do my best to summarize, and will do so in the context of gambling for ease of understanding. To further simplify, I will use a linear utility function with respect to wealth, because all of the analysis on this site seems to imply that a linear utility function is rational in football, in a sense that teams should be maximizing their chance to win.<br /><br />Economics has long maintained that you should take the action with the highest expected utility; the action with the highest arithmetic mean. This is called the ensemble approach, because it supposes multiple parallel universes that could happen, of which we will experience one. So, in the context of gambling, you would choose the bet that maximizes your expected wealth (with a linear utility function). However, Peters shows why this is flawed reasoning (unless we expect to die just after the event). Instead of an ensemble approach, the correct approach is a time series one. This means choosing the option with the highest expected geometric mean. This will lead to different choices than the ensemble approach for any process that is not ergodic. In the context of gambling, this will look like risk aversion, because the rational gambler will avoid going broke at all costs, even if he has something that looks like it is nearly a sure-thing.<br /><br />To give an example, suppose a gambler has $10 total wealth and is offered a bet that he knows with certainty to have exactly a 70% chance of winning. The bet returns double the wager amount if it won. He also has no other uses/opportunities for his money at this moment, but may have opportunities again in the future with unknown probability. We’re still assuming a linear utility function, so using the ensemble approach the rational decision is to bet his full $10 to maximize his expected wealth, but has a 30% chance of going broke. Using a time series approach, he would choose to bet $4. To get this, you search for the optimal bet amount by maximizing the weighted geometric mean of the expected end states using the equation found here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weighted_geometric_mean<br /><br />Under the traditional economics philosophy, a gambler betting $4 would be seen as irrational given his linear utility function. But regardless of the shape of the utility function, choosing the action with the highest geometric mean is the only strategy to maximize his wealth over the long run.<br /><br />Here’s how it might apply to football: a coach believes that he will have to make multiple tough decisions with risky choices over the course of the game. Choosing risky options early and often can get his team into a deep hole quickly (the equivalent of going broke for the gambler). They should choose the option with the highest expected geometric mean, not the highest expected arithmetic mean. As a result, they will often appear to be less rational using the ensemble approach than they actually are using the time series approach.<br /><br />The one wrinkle is that in a sense the head coach does “die”at the end of the game. So it would seem that the rational thing to do would be to take fewer risks earlier in the game when failures have a chance of compounding over the length of the game (don’t go broke too early), and then take more risks as the end is near (and score differential doesn’t matter, just win or lose, so don’t worry about high risk/high reward plays if you’re behind). So it seems that the rational thing to do is to move from a time series approach toward an ensemble approach as the game moves on. And in fact, that does come closer to what we actually see.probable pickshttp://probablepicks.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-54373911362740344342012-10-30T19:39:05.652-04:002012-10-30T19:39:05.652-04:00Philip Kendall already mentioned declarations in c...Philip Kendall already mentioned declarations in cricket -- ending your innings early to get more time to turn a draw into a win. There are also certain players who bat with minimal concern for defense (e.g., Shahid Afridi, nicknamed Boom-Boom), and bowlers who try to get wickets despite the possibility of conceding runs (Lasith Malinga). <br /><br />Some colleagues of mine just published a paper showing that social exclusion leads to increased financial risk-taking ("Show me the honey!": https://www.jcr-admin.org/pressreleases.php?issue=54).<br /><br />And speaking of board games, how about Risk itself? :-)Anirban Mukhopadhyaynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-56068612858203783072012-10-30T18:48:35.438-04:002012-10-30T18:48:35.438-04:00Philip - Doubling in backgammon is not a losing pr...Philip - Doubling in backgammon is not a losing proposition unless you're doubling poorly. (The same applies for accepting the proposition of a double.) Surely poor doubles happen professionally, but nowhere near common enough to qualify for what Brian is talking about.Marverhttp://www.placeholder.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-61486091812879904102012-10-30T16:56:56.738-04:002012-10-30T16:56:56.738-04:00My guess is that the Broncos are doing so well exa...My guess is that the Broncos are doing so well exactly because they were playing from behind so much this season....so they had to take risks. Hard to quantify though. <br /><br />JudoJohnAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-50247914052540533132012-10-30T16:50:41.587-04:002012-10-30T16:50:41.587-04:00Exampels of high variance (risky) choices I can th...Exampels of high variance (risky) choices I can think of: <br />Soccor: pulling the keeper when down one goal on a conor. <br />Handball: basiclly the same as situation as hockey, except 31-30 games is very likely, so at least on the surface, it seams more likely to succed. the court is the same size as basket,and the ball is easy enough to throw into the goal from your own goal.<br />All endurance based sports: When forcing the tempo. You don't know of you hit halfway through. The difference between that and 4th down in NFL is that here, the reaction is: "no guts, no glory," while in the NFL, it's :"why did you do that, you have no confidence in your D, etc."Martinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01751939331151507964noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-42020148780423617912012-10-30T15:52:33.855-04:002012-10-30T15:52:33.855-04:00Pulling your goalie in hockey has already been men...Pulling your goalie in hockey has already been mentioned.<br /><br />The one other example I can think of is in first class/Test match cricket, where matches are time-limited - you will not uncommonly see one team declare (voluntarily end their innings early) to give themselves a chance to bowl the opposition out, thus converting a virtually certain draw into a situation where both teams have a chance of winning.<br /><br />I'm sure there are lots of board game examples of this; doubling in backgammon instantly springs to mind.Philip Kendallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08392148149336638996noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-35052004898625674652012-10-30T14:27:03.947-04:002012-10-30T14:27:03.947-04:00As a Colts fan, I remember Jeff Fisher trying mutl...As a Colts fan, I remember Jeff Fisher trying mutliple onside kicks against the Colts in a 2004 game. In the first half. Some googling turned up this article, with some interesting quotes:<br /><br /><a href="http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/magazine/archives/news/story?page=magazine-20071203-article31" rel="nofollow">JEFF FISHER'S TITANS WERE ON THE VERGE OF BECOMING IRRELEVANT. THEN THE RISK-LOVING COACH MADE SOME RADICAL CHOICES- STARTING WITH LENDALE WHITE AND VINCE YOUNG</a><br /><br />From the article:<br /><br />Actually, the Titans' balls-to-the-walls mind-set comes from a time when they had nothing to lose. In December 2004, Fisher's team officially was a mess. Following two Straight playoff seasons, Tennessee had fallen to 4-7. With their defense decimated by injuries, the Titans faced a road game against the red-hot Colts offense. After two allnighters, Fisher and his staff came to a conclusion: We have no chance of winning unless we roll the dice. "We thought, Why not just onside kick it?" says Fisher. "So we did. And we did. And we did."<br /><br />The article has a timestamp of July 2012, but it looks to date from around 2007.Michael Beuoyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03960600491528993233noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-47945158776806141362012-10-30T14:19:06.184-04:002012-10-30T14:19:06.184-04:00I do think there's one sport where the player&...I do think there's one sport where the player's rewarded for risk-seeking as opposed to risk-averse behavior. That sport is tennis. Actually, it's really only 1 shot in tennis where it's true, and that's on the serve.<br /><br />Tennis, like most sports is about eliminating errors and giving randomness/luck/momentum or whatever you call it, the best opportunity to go in your favor. The one place that's not true is the serve, especially for big servers.<br /><br />If you have a big serve, there is an immediate reward for hitting an ace. Some might say that people go after big serves, because you have a second serve, but there are two places this falls down.<br /><br />There is the percentage of first serves in and there's the percentage of points won on first serve. It behooves a player to have both of those as high as possible. However, if you're going to let one of those drop, and you have a big serve, you're better off being taking the risk and going for the big serve.<br /><br />This is true to a lesser extent on the second serve also. If you're more aggressive with your serve, your opponent can do less damage with their return.<br /><br />I don't want to write a thesis on it, but I believe the way the service game is structured, if you have a good serve, you are better off being risk seeking than risk averse. It's the structure that drives that particular outcome.Andrew Meyerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13950859437400162668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-37813081656227407612012-10-30T14:06:08.004-04:002012-10-30T14:06:08.004-04:00Three thoughts.
-- Regarding the examples in the ...Three thoughts.<br /><br />-- Regarding the examples in the OP, I disagree with the premise. Yes, some people will be willing to spend $18.60 for a 10% chance at $100, but lots of people wouldn't be willing to spend $5 for a chance at $100. You can't just look at the far right end of the curve.<br /><br />-- The RG3 was the first thing that came to mind when discussing risk-seeking behavior, which was already pointed out.<br /><br />-- Also agree that blitzing is risk-seeking behavior.Chase Stuarthttp://www.footballperspective.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-87914138544008726832012-10-30T12:50:26.727-04:002012-10-30T12:50:26.727-04:00Trent,
I think what you may mean by your .03% num...Trent,<br /><br />I think what you may mean by your .03% number is that .03% beat the S&P 500 every year or every quarter. <br /><br />From 12/31/93 to 12/31/03, there were 655 open end mutual funds that could be considered "S&P 500 like". The Vanguard 500 Index fund was built to precisely track the S&P 500. Of those 655, 203 beat the Vanguard 500 and 451 did not. The numbers are not flattering to the industry, but with roughly 1/3 outperforming it is much better than .03%.<br /><br />source: MorningstarAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-53229235978153381012012-10-30T12:27:38.128-04:002012-10-30T12:27:38.128-04:00I think we're forgetting about the defensive s...I think we're forgetting about the defensive side of the ball with the risk seeking discussion. Blitzing is a risk seeking behavior. The risk averse counter example is playing a soft zone defense to keep the other team from scoring too early.<br /><br />On offense, throwing the bomb is risk seeking.<br /><br />For personel decisions, playing a rookie QB when you have a high priced veteran would be risk seeking (Tom Brady vs. Drew Bledsoe, Russell Wilson vs. Matt Flynn, the movie "Any Given Sunday")Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38600807.post-55975157066179521342012-10-30T12:24:10.415-04:002012-10-30T12:24:10.415-04:00Trent,
I think that is closer to a lack of knowle...Trent,<br /><br />I think that is closer to a lack of knowledge in many cases. Consider that many investments in mutual funds are small amounts by many small investors through their banks/retirement accounts, who filter their clients to a small number of funds they have predesignated as the only ones they offer (often managed by the bank or administrator of the retirement account, a classic principal-agent dilemma).MFLoGrassohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16421311347964163796noreply@blogger.com