Down 14-0 at the start of the second half to the New York Giants,
the Houston Texans faced a 4th-and-1 on their own 46-yard line. At this point, with just a 9.0% chance to win, Bill O'Brien made the correct call to go for it. A successful conversion means a 12.9% win probability, while a punt means about an 8.6% chance to win. The break-even point going for it is far below an estimated 65% conversion rate on 4th-and-1. Alfred Blue ran off right tackle and was stuffed, turning the ball over on downs. The Giants would kick a field goal to go up 17-0.
On the very next drive, Ryan Fitzpatrick led the Texans downfield to the Giants 9-yard line where they faced another 4th-and-1. With 6:13 left in the third, down 17, Bill O'Brien elected to take the chip-shot field goal. Even the commentators suggested he should be going for it. Obviously, the prior failure on fourth down should not have an affect on the Texans' decision this time. If that were the case, O'Brien would be judging his previous decision on the outcome, rather than the process. The only other logic could be that he figured they would need a field goal at some point, down 17 - common faulty logic in the NFL as coaches should be doing whatever they can to maximize their chances of winning.
Texans Try Once, Fail Twice
Eagles Escape Embarrassment
Let my bias not be unknown, I am an Eagles fan. Watching Nick Foles fumble twice, throw an interception, and Chad Henne connect with rookie Allen Hurns twice for touchdowns -- all in the first half -- was one of the more frustrating ways to start the season. The Eagles were lucky to only be down 17-0 at halftime. On the opening drive of the second half, Philly converted twice and Nick Foles connected with Darren Sproles for eight yards on 3rd-and-9, bringing up a 4th-and-1 at the Jaguars 49-yard line.
Chip Kelly is known for his progressive thinking and he didn't hesitate -- calling for a hurry-up, one of the first times the Eagles really played up-tempo in the game. The Jaguars safeties got crossed and a huge gap opened up as Darren Sproles ran untouched for a 49-yard score. The Eagles would not look back and ultimately went on to win "handily," 34-17. Had the Eagles not converted, though, Kelly would likely have been ridiculed for his call as it could have effectively ended the game (dropping Philly's win probability to 5.4%).
Let's look at the fourth down call, taking into consideration the relative strength of the two teams.
Chargers Courageous Call & Playoff-Clinching Drive
Despite the controversy surrounding an illegal defense on the Chiefs' missed field goal at the end of regulation, the San Diego Chargers defied odds and clinched a postseason berth on Sunday. In overtime, Philip Rivers orchestrated a 17-play, nine-and-a-half minute field goal drive to start the extra quarter that ultimately sealed their win. The length of the drive, in this case, is just as important as the outcome as San Diego could advance with either a win or a tie.
Using our Markov model, let's take a look at the drive. Keep in mind, the model is best used for a standard drive when time and score differential would not greatly affect decision-making or play-calling. Since this was the opening drive of overtime, those standards will predominantly hold true, although not perfectly given the leverage of the situation.
Four Fourth Quarter Fourth Down Decisions
With a loss to the Redskins on Sunday, the Dallas Cowboys would leave themselves vulnerable to being eliminated from the playoffs by an Eagles win on Sunday Night. Heading into the fourth quarter, Tony Romo and company trailed 23-14. Starting from their own 20-yard line, the Cowboys drove to the Washington 35 before facing a 4th-and-1.
Fourth Down #1:
4th-and-1 converts around 70% and results in 22% win probability on a success and 7% win probability on a failure. E[WP] = 18%
In 2013, a 52-53 yard field goal converts about 62% and results in 17% win probability on a success and 6% win probability on a failure. E[WP] = 13%
E[WP] for a punt is a mere 9%.
Jason Garrett decided to go for it, this was the right decision. Unfortunately, Doug Free moved early forcing a 4th-and-6.
Is the Revolution Over? Did We Win?
"The Revolution Was Televised. The fourth down revolution is over. Going for it won."
Is Mike right? Did going for it really win? Mike makes a the case, and cites several promising examples of unconventional 4th down decisions from one Sunday afternoon earlier this season:
"-The Lions going for it on 4th-and-goal from the two-yard line, early in their win over the Cowboys.
-The Dolphins going for it on 4th-and-1 from the Patriots' 38-yard line, in the second quarter.
-The Patriots going for it on 4th-and-4 from the Dolphins' 34-yard line, while leading by three points in the fourth quarter.
-The Bengals going for it on 4th-and-inches from the 1-yard line, while leading 14-0 against the Jets.
-The Broncos scoring a 4th-and-goal touchdown to tie the game at 21 against the Redskins, in the third quarter.
-The Packers converting a 4th-and-3 from their own 42-yard line, setting up a touchdown to increase their lead to 31-17."
I think Mike is right to point out some very interesting cases where coaches are making some notable decisions, but the revolution is far from complete. I would suggest that an avalanche is the better analogy than revolution. One day there may be an avalanche of aggressive 4th down decisions, but right now we're only seeing a few rocks trickle down the mountainside. It's not that there haven't been bold examples of enlightenment. It's just that there are so many opportunities that coaches have spurned.
Lions' Odd Fake Field Goal
After stopping a Detroit Lions' fake field goal attempt, down 23-27, the Pittsburgh Steelers went on to score two unanswered touchdowns - clearly a product of momentum - and win the game 37-27. When the Lions faked the field goal, I was a little bit baffled. Normally, inside the 10 or so it makes sense to go for it because even with a failure, opposing offenses are pinned so deep in their own territory - depending on distance-to-go. 4th-and-5, with vertical space restricted at the 10-yard line, is not an easy conversion; it converts league-wide around 36%. Based purely on efficiency (not including time remaining or score differential), a field goal results in greater return (+0.16 EP over going for it). It's not a huge difference, as the break even point is only 39% conversion probability.
Frazier's Fourth Down Decision & Walsh Misses Wide
As 8.5 point underdogs, the Vikings managed to not only stay in the game with the Cowboys, but hold a lead with the ball nearing the end of regulation. Up 23-20, Christian Ponder faced a 4th-and-5 from the Cowboys 36-yard line with 3:04 remaining. While we are almost always a proponent of going for it in no-man's land, this presents an interesting decision point. Dallas had two timeouts remaining and with a conversion, Minnesota would be able to milk a good portion of the clock. With a made field goal from Blair Walsh - one of the top kickers in the league, despite his earlier missed extra point - the Vikings win probability actually falls to 75%. We have talked about this previously, being down six is sometimes better than being down three.
Jets 'Push' Their Luck
After forcing overtime, the Jets stopped the Patriots on their first drive, reverting to the old OT format - sudden death. Geno Smith and the Jets moved downfield before being stopped for a 4th-and-7 from the New England 38. Rex Ryan had three viable options here, keeping in mind that the next score wins: Kick a low-probability (40% league-wide) 55-yard field goal, attempt to convert a low-probability (42% league-wide) 4th-and-7, or punt the ball deep and risk Tom Brady leading a game-winning drive.
The Jets elected to attempt the field goal. Nick Folk missed wide left, but in a crazy turn of events, New England was penalized 15-yards for an unsportsmanlike conduct "pushing" penalty. Before we get to the penalty, let's talk about the decision. While I almost always advocate going for it in no-man's land, in this situation, I was leaning toward the punt.
For this analysis, I used a combination of my Markov probabilities as well as Brian's overtime win probabilities.
Bengals Punt Away Regulation
What Are You Doing, Chip?
Cards on the table, I'm a huge Eagles fan. As an NFL stats nerd, I could not have been more excited for Chip Kelly to make the transition to the big leagues. While I did not expect him to immediately institute his Oregon trademarks, I did expect to see him going for it more often on fourth down, especially in situations where the numbers called for it -- and generally, making decisions to maximize the Eagles win probability.
It's four weeks into the season, and too many times I've asked my TV, "What are you doing, Chip?" Today against the Broncos, there were a couple of questionable decisions. Down 14-3, the Eagles were moving the ball very well to start the game. Vick and company strung together a 15-play drive that ended up with a 4th-and-4 from the Broncos 7-yard line. Using our Markov model, we can look at the progression of the drive:
Same Decision, Different Results
Within about thirty seconds of real time, both two NFC North teams were faced with the same dilemma: 4th-and-1 in "field goal range," up three points with four minutes left in the game.
1. Detroit Lions: The Lions faced off against the Redskins on Sunday and went for it from the 12-yard line. Matt Stafford kept it and went up the middle, gaining two yards and converting. The decision here is pretty straight forward from a numbers perspective - especially on a 4th-and-1 - but so many coaches make the wrong choice.
Jason Garrett Should Have Punted
by Matt Meiselman
Matt has been helped me crunch some numbers this off-season. He is graduate of the University of Maryland with a degree in broadcast journalism. He's originally from New Jersey, but loves New York sports. Matt aspires to work in sports media and has a passion for sports statistics.
We're trying hard not to be broken records on 4th down decisions, but this one is special. -BB
Jason Garrett is not typically regarded as a savvy 4th down decision maker, and his clock management skills aren’t the greatest either. Garrett consistently makes blunders in way too many of his strategic decisions. But even after all the mistakes he’s made as the Cowboys head coach, he somehow found a way to top every one of them with a single mistake in Week 2 against the Chiefs.
With 3:50 to play in the 4th quarter, Dallas trailed Kansas City 17-13. It was the Cowboys’ ball, but they faced a 4th and 10 from the Chiefs 35. They held all three of their timeouts and undoubtedly still had a decent opportunity to come away with a win. Garrett had a decision to make: should he go for it? Punt? Or a kick a field goal?
Based on the 4th down calculator, the Cowboys chose the worst of the three options, and it wasn’t even close.
Bucs Botch Fourth Down Call
With 1:10 remaining in the fourth quarter, Tampa Bay led 14-13 on the Saints' 29-yard line. Facing a 4th-and-3, with an 82% chance to win the game, Greg Schiano elected to attempt the 46-yard field goal - about a 64% proposition. If the Bucs hit the field goal, they go up four points, increasing their win probability to 86%. With a miss, the win probability drops to 74% and Drew Brees gets the ball on the 36, needing only a field goal to win.
Saints Slip Up, Still Win
Sean Payton is back in the decision-maker chair for the Saints after his one-year sabbatical, and he is typically known as one of the more analytical coaches. The Saints pass more often than other teams, they go for it on fourth down more often, and even try the occasional surprise onside kick.
On Sunday, Payton faced a couple of fourth down decisions, testing his analytical mind. On their second drive, the Saints ran the ball on 4th-and-1 from their own 47-yard line -- a sizable gamble to the traditional football mind. Mark Ingram was stuffed and the Falcons would turn good starting field position into a field goal. This was definitely the right decision, despite the outcome (+0.84 EP going for it vs -0.30 EP with a punt).
The much bigger decision, though, came with 3:30 left in the game up three. The Saints faced a 4th-and-2 from the 4-yard line after a 5-yard completion to Lance Moore. Drew Brees lined up to attempt a 4th-down conversion but Payton ultimately decided to take a timeout to think things over. After the timeout, the Saints came out in field goal formation, made the chip shot and went up 23-17.
So, what do the numbers say?
Win Probability Forfeited 2012
by Matt Meiselman
Matt has been helping me crunch some 4th down numbers this off-season. He is a senior at the University of Maryland studying broadcast journalism. He's originally from New Jersey, but loves New York sports. Matt aspires to work in sports media and has a passion for sports statistics. -BB
In last year's article on this subject, Brian talked about how coaches aren’t just saving wins if they’re more aggressive; they are simultaneously forfeiting wins by being too meek. In 2011, the average team forfeited .65 wins for the year on 4th down decisions alone. The NFL has started to become more risk-friendly instead of risk-averse, and you’d expect that with more innovative minds in the game, like Bill Belicheck and Jim Harbaugh, the league would be trending towards more optimum game management. This was not the case in 2012.
During the 2012 season, the average team forfeited .73 wins, a significant increase from the year before. The average win probability forfeited per opportunity also rose, jumping from 1.6% of a win to 1.9% of a win. Below are the calculations for each team:
Patriots Primarily Punt on Fourth Down
Bill Belichick is known for being one of the greatest football minds in NFL history. He's also known for being one of the "riskiest" play-callers -- riskiest in quotes to emphasize that he actually plays to the odds rather than most of the conservative football minds. Down 28-13 in the AFC Championship game, avid Patriots fan Bill Simmons put it best: "Ravens playing to win, Pats playing not to lose."
Belichick faced eight fourth downs in the game against the Ravens, seven of which were legitimate questions for the best course of action: Go for it, punt or kick the field goal. Whereas we would normally expect Belichick to be aggressive, he seemed more reserved in his decision-making. There are a ton of factors that could explain his passive play-calling. For example, it was extremely windy making field goals more difficult and maybe Belichick did not have faith that Joe Flacco could sustain a 90-yard drive due to the Ravens boom-or-bust offense (the Ravens ended up with three scoring drives of 10+ plays including a 90-yarder and 87-yarder).
Let's look at each fourth down decision, starting with the very first. Remember in the beginning of the game, especially if the score is fairly close, we should look at expected points, but as score and time become bigger factors, we will switch to win probability. Also, note that these are league baselines. The fact that the Patriots offense is No. 1 in the league and far above league average would indicate a higher success rate on 4th-down conversion attempts.
The Seahawks' 4th and 1
I keep reading and hearing about how the failed 4th down attempt 'came back to bite Seattle' or that the decision cost 3 points in a game decided by 2. First of all, that's complete outcome bias. Expunge that kind of thinking from your head. Had SEA converted, the same people who are now critical would be praising Carroll for his courage. Second, you can't simply append 3 extra points onto the final score and say that would have changed the outcome. You never know how the game may have unfolded had Carroll decided on the FG attempt. Both teams would have played at different risk levels and at different paces had the score been different, particularly in the endgame.
I've refrained from the cookie-cutter 'should have gone for it, coach' posts this season for fear of becoming a one-trick pony. (Especially now that everyone can do the same thing himself with the 4th Down Calculator.) But this was a critical call in an important game, so I'll indulge. Here are the numbers on the 4th down itself. Remember, results are based on league average baseline numbers. It was 4th and 1 on the ATL 11 with 5:38 in the 2nd qtr. ATL was up 13-0.
New Overtime 4th Down Decisions When Down 3 Points
Your opponent kicked a FG on the first possession of overtime, and now your team needs a TD to win or a FG to continue the game. Your offense has driven down to the opponent's 10-yard line, but the drive has stalled. It's 4th down and 3. Should you go for the risky conversion and ultimately a TD for the win, or should you attempt a FG knowing you'd be at a disadvantage giving the ball to the opponent in sudden death?
The new NFL OT rules are unique in a lot of ways, and by unique I mean convoluted and contrived. There are basically three possible game states:
1. The first drive in which no score leads to Sudden Death, a TD wins, or a FG spawns the second state...
2. A possible second possession in which the offense is down by 3 points. It must score a TD to win or a FG to continue into SD.
3. Lastly, traditional SD itself.
The three game states successively easier to model. The first possession must consider all the possibilities of the following two states. The second state must only consider itself and the possibility of SD. The second possession is also slightly easier to model because there is no punt option. An offense trailing by 3 points simply must score or lose.
Cowboys Kick (Twice), But Still Win
In one of the more intriguing match-ups of the weekend, Tony Romo and the Cowboys received the ball in a tie game just over midfield with 0:47 seconds remaining. After two incompletions and one pass to Jason Witten, the Cowboys faced a 4th-and-4 at the Steelers 43-yard line. With 0:32 seconds to go and one timeout left, the Cowboys trot out their field goal team for a miraculous 60-yard game-winning kick. Both teams would call timeout and Jason Garrett would ultimately decide to punt instead, essentially assuring overtime. Let's think about this decision generally before looking at the frequency specifics.
If you punt, you are conceding to play overtime, giving your team a 50/50 shot to win the game. If you kick a field goal from that range, the probability that it goes in is at best the same as the probability that you miss and your opponent can score before the end of regulation, giving you a 50/50 chance to win optimistically. If you go for it and convert, you will have a much higher probability of making the field goal even with time constraints -- if you fail, you are pretty much in the same situation as a missed field goal.
Fourth Downs in the New Overtime: First Possession
1. The initial drive of the first possession (A TD wins, a turnover or punt triggers Sudden Death (SD), and a FG triggers State 2.)
2. The team down by 3 now has one possession to match the FG (triggering SD) or score a TD to win.
3. Sudden Death
The possibilities are illustrated in the event tree below, along with some back-of-the-napkin transition probabilities I made back when the new rules were first proposed. (State 1 is "1st Poss". State 2 is the branch under "2nd Poss" that follows a FG in the 1st Poss. Sudden death is self-explanatory and occurs after a no-score in the 1st Poss or after a FG is matched in the 2nd Poss.)