Game Probabilities - Week 11

Weekly game probabilities are available now at the nytimes.com Fifth Down. This week I also look at what's plaguing the Jets, and how it affects their match-up against the Patriots this week.

Belichick 4th Down Follow-Up

Thanks to the commenters on the original post, all 200+ of you, for all the great criticisms and suggestions. The Internet is a big place, and although not every comment was helpful, I was pleased to see such a thoughtful and constructive debate. In this follow-up, I'll try to address some of the most common criticisms and questions. I suspect some skeptics will never be fully satisfied, but I feel many of the comments deserve a response.

1. You used 38 yds for the expected punt distance, the average punt distance for that region of the field. But Patriots punter Chris Hansen had averaged 4 punts for 44 yds. Why not use that distance instead?

Team Efficiency Rankings - Week 11

The team rankings below are in terms of generic win probability. The GWP is the probability a team would beat the league average team at a neutral site. Each team's opponent's average GWP is also listed, which can be considered to-date strength of schedule, and all ratings include adjustments for opponent strength.

Offensive rank (ORANK) is offensive generic win probability, which is based on each team's offensive efficiency stats only. In other words, it's the team's GWP assuming it had a league-average defense. DRANK is is a team's generic win probability rank assuming it had a league-average offense.

GWP is based on a logistic regression model applied to current team stats. The model includes offensive and defensive passing and running efficiency, offensive turnover rates, defensive interception rates, and team penalty rates. If you're scratching your head wondering why a team is ranked where it is, just scroll down to the second table to see the stats of all 32 teams.

Should the Patriots Have Let the Colts Score?

After the Patriots' failed 4th down conversion attempt in the now epic game against the Colts, they wound up facing a Colts offense with a 1st down on the Pats' own 14-yard line. With 1:20 on the clock, the Patriots could have allowed the Colts to score an easy touchdown, yielding a 1-point lead, but giving the Patriots a shot to take the lead back with a possible FG drive. Or, they could have played straight defense, hoping to keep the Colts out of the end zone.

I'll take a look at league-wide averages, and then we can make adjustments from there. Against a team needing a TD, playing straight defense yields a TD about 62% of the time. This means the Patriots would have a 0.38 Win Probability (WP).

The Two-Minute Drill

In my recent posts on the Maurice Jones-Drew kneel-down and the Belichick 4th down decision I cited a few stats about how likely an offense that needs a touchdown to tie or win is to score one with about 2 minutes remaining in the game. Normally I like to back up obscure stats like that with some firmer context, and I was finally able to get around to it for these numbers.

The chart below graphs the percentage of time a team that needs a TD, defined as being down by 4 through 8 points, gets a TD on its current drive given a 1st down at various field positions with 2:00 +/- 15 seconds left. (I know that's quite the run-on sentence, but I don't know how else to say it.)

MJD Taking a Knee

With just under two minutes remaining against the Jets, Jaguars RB Maurice Jones Drew broke free for a go-ahead TD. Instead of plunging into the end zone he took a knee at the one-yard line. This decision allowed the Jaguars to run out the clock before kicking a chip-shot FG for the win. A TD would have allowed the Jets almost two minutes to answer with a TD of their own. How important was MJD's decision?

The analysis was a little more complicated than I thought because had the Jaguars scored the TD, they would have gone for the 2-point conversion. With a single XP, a Jets TD wins. With a failed 2-pt conversion, a Jets TD also wins. But with a successful conversion, a Jets TD only ties, so there is nothing lost and a lot to gain for the Jags by going for the 2.

Belichick's 4th Down Decision vs the Colts

New England coach Bill Belichick is taking a lot of heat for his decision to attempt a 4th down conversion late in the game against the Colts. Indianapolis came back to win in dramatic fashion. Was the decision a good one?

With 2:00 left and the Colts with only one timeout, a successful conversion wins the game for all practical purposes. A 4th and 2 conversion would be successful 60% of the time. Historically, in a situation with 2:00 left and needing a TD to either win or tie, teams get the TD 53% of the time from that field position. The total WP for the 4th down conversion attempt would be:

Game Probabilities - Week 10

Weekly game probabilities are available now at the nytimes.com Fifth Down.