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Sunday's Numbers Have Been Crunched
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Chip's Challenging Decisions
The Eagles lost to the 49ers on Sunday 26-21 in what essentially came down to two plays by the Eagles on 3rd and 4th-and-Goal from just outside the 1-yard line. There is no denying it was a close game - even though the Eagles offense was unable to move the ball all day. The Eagles made a few interesting decisions - or lack of decisions - in the second half including not challenging a 3rd-down conversion reception and accepting a penalty on 3rd-and-3 after an incompletion. Let's examine each and see how they could have affected the Eagles' win probability, keeping in mind that in close games, every percentage point counts.One Thing I Learned from the WOPR
The WOPR is my game simulation engine. I've had a ton of fun experimenting with different things, finding out when teams should make various tactical decisions that might be uncommon or hard to isolate empirically (directly from the data). But one of the more profound things I learned from the WOPR relates to game outcomes between completely even teams.
Weekly Game Probabilities - Week 4
Please remember that the projected scores are not to be taken terribly seriously. Do not bet the mortgage on them as they are not intended to graded against the spread. They are simply a "maximum-plausibility" estimate given respective team scoring tendencies.
Team Efficiency Rankings: Week 3
This obviously holds big implications for the rankings, which are based on the generic win probability (GWP) of a particular team against an average team. But more importantly, both are predictive models which emphasize factors that best suggest how likely a team is to fare in the future. When one improves, the other should theoretically improve alongside it.
We'll keep an eye on that hypothesis as the season moves along. Perhaps I'll write something at the end of the season comparing the accuracy of this year's model to 2013's. For now, let's take a look at some of the most notable trends from the first rankings of 2014 (click here for a full explanation of the rankings methodology).
Leaving Free WP All Over the Field
So why do NFL coaches voluntarily leave WP out on the field?
Take yesterday's DEN-SEA game as an example. SEA was ahead 17-12 in the 4th quarter, and had the ball deep in their own territory with about 9 minutes to play. With the game clock running, they snapped the ball with: 8, 5, 5, 8, and 10 seconds left on the play clock. That's a total of 36 seconds. Plus, there was a play in which the receiver could have just as easily remained in bounds. Because there was more than 5 minutes left in the game and the clock restarts after the ball is set, that may have only cost 10-15 seconds of play clock rather than up to 40 seconds. To be fair let's say there was a total of 46 seconds SEA could have burned off the clock during their second to last drive with almost no effort or risk.
Sunday's Numbers Have Been Crunched
Team Advanced Stats Viz
Position Leaders Viz
Advanced stat box scores
Top QBs of the week
Top RBs of the week
Top WRs of the week
Top TEs of the week
Top Defenders of the week
Advanced team stats
Offensive player season leaders
Defender season leaders
QB Viz
RB Viz
Texans Try Once, Fail Twice
Down 14-0 at the start of the second half to the New York Giants,
the Houston Texans faced a 4th-and-1 on their own 46-yard line. At this point, with just a 9.0% chance to win, Bill O'Brien made the correct call to go for it. A successful conversion means a 12.9% win probability, while a punt means about an 8.6% chance to win. The break-even point going for it is far below an estimated 65% conversion rate on 4th-and-1. Alfred Blue ran off right tackle and was stuffed, turning the ball over on downs. The Giants would kick a field goal to go up 17-0.
On the very next drive, Ryan Fitzpatrick led the Texans downfield to the Giants 9-yard line where they faced another 4th-and-1. With 6:13 left in the third, down 17, Bill O'Brien elected to take the chip-shot field goal. Even the commentators suggested he should be going for it. Obviously, the prior failure on fourth down should not have an affect on the Texans' decision this time. If that were the case, O'Brien would be judging his previous decision on the outcome, rather than the process. The only other logic could be that he figured they would need a field goal at some point, down 17 - common faulty logic in the NFL as coaches should be doing whatever they can to maximize their chances of winning.




